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Comments for Corporate Law</title>
    <atom:link href="https://feedpress.me/CommentsForJotwellCorp" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
    <link>https://corp.jotwell.com/</link>
    <description>The Journal of Things We Like (Lots)</description>
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      <title>
Comment on Responsibility for Flawed Corporate Cultures by JOHN D MATTARELLA</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/16918793/responsibility-for-flawed-corporate-cultures</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[JOHN D MATTARELLA]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 15:26:09 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1157#comment-79961</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[3 /25,000 wire transfers, in 2days. Bank said exact same thing to me. Hired lawyer also ,they refused to give back my life savings as well my daughters college $, and i need it for her medical. They also charged up my business line of credit,leaving me with a loan of 900 per month


John Mattarella 

954-593-0857 ]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>3 /25,000 wire transfers, in 2days. Bank said exact same thing to me. Hired lawyer also ,they refused to give back my life savings as well my daughters college $, and i need it for her medical. They also charged up my business line of credit,leaving me with a loan of 900 per month</p>
<p>John Mattarella </p>
<p>954-593-0857 </p>
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    <item>
      <title>
Comment on Digital Engagement and the Retail Investor by Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/16860285/digital-engagement-and-the-retail-investor</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 20 Oct 2024 16:46:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1731#comment-79289</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[The subtleties of this JOT make it a stand-alone piece of scholarship. Thank you Joan Heminway for reviewing Wireless Investors &#038; Apathy Obsolescence so insightfully]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The subtleties of this JOT make it a stand-alone piece of scholarship. Thank you Joan Heminway for reviewing Wireless Investors &amp; Apathy Obsolescence so insightfully</p>
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      <title>
Comment on What Corporate Governance for AI? by Ashley</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/16825512/what-corporate-governance-for-ai</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashley]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 2024 02:34:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1711#comment-78797</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[These are interesting points that are needed as we travel on this road to developing governance all these touch points need assessment. Great point picked up. It is this multi- Talent that will help to reign this AI giant that we are trying to tame for better Human in loop designs]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>These are interesting points that are needed as we travel on this road to developing governance all these touch points need assessment. Great point picked up. It is this multi- Talent that will help to reign this AI giant that we are trying to tame for better Human in loop designs</p>
<img src="https://feedpress.me/link/16865/16825512.gif" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
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    <item>
      <title>
Comment on Bringing the Fiduciary Back In by ‘Bringing the Fiduciary Back In’ | Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/15387271/bringing-the-fiduciary-back-in</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[&#8216;Bringing the Fiduciary Back In&#8217; &#124; Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jun 2022 11:01:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1526#comment-69666</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[[&#8230;] David Kershaw, &#8216;Delaware’s Fiduciary Imagination: Going Privates and Lord Eldon’s Reprise&#8217;, 98 Washington Law Review 1669 (2021). Wisdom sometimes is best recognized by a traveler. In &#8216;Delaware’s Fiduciary Imagination: Going Privates and Lord Eldon’s Reprise&#8217;, Professor David Kershaw of the London School of Economics revisits cases that we know very well, putting them in the context of British decisions, and elicits a distinction that appears obvious, yet comes as a bit of a surprise: There is a distinction between abuse of power and abuse of influence. These are two ideal types of the &#8216;source of obligation&#8217; for fiduciaries &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] David Kershaw, &#8216;Delaware’s Fiduciary Imagination: Going Privates and Lord Eldon’s Reprise&#8217;, 98 Washington Law Review 1669 (2021). Wisdom sometimes is best recognized by a traveler. In &#8216;Delaware’s Fiduciary Imagination: Going Privates and Lord Eldon’s Reprise&#8217;, Professor David Kershaw of the London School of Economics revisits cases that we know very well, putting them in the context of British decisions, and elicits a distinction that appears obvious, yet comes as a bit of a surprise: There is a distinction between abuse of power and abuse of influence. These are two ideal types of the &#8216;source of obligation&#8217; for fiduciaries &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]</p>
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      <title>
Comment on The Value of a Shareholding by ‘The Value of a Shareholding’ | Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/15141149/the-value-of-a-shareholding</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[&#8216;The Value of a Shareholding&#8217; &#124; Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 10 Mar 2022 14:01:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1497#comment-68922</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[[&#8230;] Charles Korsmo and Minor Myers, &#8216;What Do Stockholders Own? The Rise of the Trading Price Paradigm in Corporate Law&#8217;, 47 Journal of Corporate Law (forthcoming, 2021), available at SSRN. The valuation of a shareholder’s interest in a corporation is a central issue in corporate law. In recent cases the Delaware courts have responded to appraisal arbitrage by limiting recovery in appraisal actions to deal price, deal price less synergy, or even market price unaffected by the deal. The cases have given rise to a literature of both praise and critique. Charles Korsmo and Minor Myers take the analysis a step further in &#8216;What Do Stockholders Own? The Rise of the Trading Price Paradigm in Corporate Law&#8217;, arguing that the implications of these appraisal decisions reach beyond appraisal to cases involving mergers more generally, and suggest an incipient paradigm shift in how Delaware law conceives of the (value of the) stockholder’s interest in the corporation: &#8216;[i]n a real sense, the Supreme Court in the appraisal cases has simply altered its conception of the public corporation as a form of property&#8217; (p 3) &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] Charles Korsmo and Minor Myers, &#8216;What Do Stockholders Own? The Rise of the Trading Price Paradigm in Corporate Law&#8217;, 47 Journal of Corporate Law (forthcoming, 2021), available at SSRN. The valuation of a shareholder’s interest in a corporation is a central issue in corporate law. In recent cases the Delaware courts have responded to appraisal arbitrage by limiting recovery in appraisal actions to deal price, deal price less synergy, or even market price unaffected by the deal. The cases have given rise to a literature of both praise and critique. Charles Korsmo and Minor Myers take the analysis a step further in &#8216;What Do Stockholders Own? The Rise of the Trading Price Paradigm in Corporate Law&#8217;, arguing that the implications of these appraisal decisions reach beyond appraisal to cases involving mergers more generally, and suggest an incipient paradigm shift in how Delaware law conceives of the (value of the) stockholder’s interest in the corporation: &#8216;[i]n a real sense, the Supreme Court in the appraisal cases has simply altered its conception of the public corporation as a form of property&#8217; (p 3) &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]</p>
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      <title>
Comment on The Path Toward Corporate Accountability on Human Rights by ‘The Path Toward Corporate Accountability on Human Rights’ | Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/14729411/the-path-toward-corporate-accountability-on-human-rights</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[&#8216;The Path Toward Corporate Accountability on Human Rights&#8217; &#124; Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Sep 2021 09:00:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1461#comment-68241</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[[&#8230;] Erika George, &#8216;Incorporating Rights: Strategies to Advance Corporate Accountability&#8217; (2021). Corporate law readers: Do not let this excellent new work by Erika George escape your attention. It is a book focused on human rights. But make no mistake it is about corporations and it richly deserves a spot on your reading list. The motivating problem in this area is relatively well understood: global human rights slip through the cracks of different regulatory regimes. As Professor George explains: &#8216;[C]orporate law fails to adequately address the external effects of the modern corporation and its relationship to society&#8217;. Further, &#8216;public international law fails to adequately govern the conduct of private nonstate actors&#8217;. Multinational corporations influence the ability of many millions of people to enjoy human rights, but these corporations are not currently understood to have the requisite international legal personality to become a party to an existing, binding international human rights treaty &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] Erika George, &#8216;Incorporating Rights: Strategies to Advance Corporate Accountability&#8217; (2021). Corporate law readers: Do not let this excellent new work by Erika George escape your attention. It is a book focused on human rights. But make no mistake it is about corporations and it richly deserves a spot on your reading list. The motivating problem in this area is relatively well understood: global human rights slip through the cracks of different regulatory regimes. As Professor George explains: &#8216;[C]orporate law fails to adequately address the external effects of the modern corporation and its relationship to society&#8217;. Further, &#8216;public international law fails to adequately govern the conduct of private nonstate actors&#8217;. Multinational corporations influence the ability of many millions of people to enjoy human rights, but these corporations are not currently understood to have the requisite international legal personality to become a party to an existing, binding international human rights treaty &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]</p>
<img src="https://feedpress.me/link/16865/14729411.gif" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
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      <title>
Comment on The Path Toward Corporate Accountability on Human Rights by El roam</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/14728232/the-path-toward-corporate-accountability-on-human-rights</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[El roam]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2021 16:01:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1461#comment-68240</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[Important issue. 

Just in case, that it has not been mentioned in the book reviewed here, there is another way or intention recently:

To incorporate, directly into the Rome statute, crimes, or recently, crimes against the environment (Ecocide). Then, probably, would include corporations, or rather, executive liability( for only natural persons, can face justice in the ICC). 

Here (very recommended blog by itself) titled:

&quot;The Ecocide-International Environmental Crime Nexus: When Can an International Environmental Crime be Called “Ecocide”?&quot;

Here:

https://internationallaw.blog/2021/06/25/the-ecocide-international-environmental-crime-nexus-when-can-an-international-environmental-crime-be-called-ecocide/

Thanks]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Important issue. </p>
<p>Just in case, that it has not been mentioned in the book reviewed here, there is another way or intention recently:</p>
<p>To incorporate, directly into the Rome statute, crimes, or recently, crimes against the environment (Ecocide). Then, probably, would include corporations, or rather, executive liability( for only natural persons, can face justice in the ICC). </p>
<p>Here (very recommended blog by itself) titled:</p>
<p>&#8220;The Ecocide-International Environmental Crime Nexus: When Can an International Environmental Crime be Called “Ecocide”?&#8221;</p>
<p>Here:</p>
<p><a href="https://internationallaw.blog/2021/06/25/the-ecocide-international-environmental-crime-nexus-when-can-an-international-environmental-crime-be-called-ecocide/" rel="nofollow ugc">https://internationallaw.blog/2021/06/25/the-ecocide-international-environmental-crime-nexus-when-can-an-international-environmental-crime-be-called-ecocide/</a></p>
<p>Thanks</p>
<img src="https://feedpress.me/link/16865/14728232.gif" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
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      <title>
Comment on Law and (Which?) Entrepreneurship by ‘Law and (Which?) Entrepreneurship’ | Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/14551054/law-and-which-entrepreneurship</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[&#8216;Law and (Which?) Entrepreneurship&#8217; &#124; Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Jun 2021 16:15:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1424#comment-68089</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[[&#8230;] Magnus Henrekson and Tino Sanandaji, &#8216;Measuring Entrepreneurship: Do Established Metrics Capture Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship?&#8217;, 44 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 733 (2020). We often hear that entrepreneurship is important to the economy. But what exactly is &#8216;entrepreneurship&#8217;? There is a broad and growing literature connecting institutions with entrepreneurship in the fields of law, economics, finance, and business generally. Legal scholars in this field typically focus on the role of &#8216;law&#8217; and treat &#8216;entrepreneurship&#8217; as a taken-for-granted concept that does not need any discussion. Yet, it is important to recognize that researchers in the broader non-legal literature on the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship have been struggling to define and measure &#8216;entrepreneurship&#8217;. Empirical research that measures entrepreneurship inaccurately may lead to flawed conclusions including legal policy recommendations &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] Magnus Henrekson and Tino Sanandaji, &#8216;Measuring Entrepreneurship: Do Established Metrics Capture Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship?&#8217;, 44 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 733 (2020). We often hear that entrepreneurship is important to the economy. But what exactly is &#8216;entrepreneurship&#8217;? There is a broad and growing literature connecting institutions with entrepreneurship in the fields of law, economics, finance, and business generally. Legal scholars in this field typically focus on the role of &#8216;law&#8217; and treat &#8216;entrepreneurship&#8217; as a taken-for-granted concept that does not need any discussion. Yet, it is important to recognize that researchers in the broader non-legal literature on the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship have been struggling to define and measure &#8216;entrepreneurship&#8217;. Empirical research that measures entrepreneurship inaccurately may lead to flawed conclusions including legal policy recommendations &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]</p>
<img src="https://feedpress.me/link/16865/14551054.gif" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
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Comment on If It Is Discoverable, It May Count: From Shareholder Rights to Inspect Books and Records to Implementing Caremark Duties by ‘If It Is Discoverable, It May Count: From Shareholder Rights to Inspect Books and Records to Implementing Caremark Duties’ | Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/15699279/if-it-is-discoverable-it-may-count-from-shareholder-rights-to-inspect-books-and-records-to-implementing-caremark-duties</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[&#8216;If It Is Discoverable, It May Count: From Shareholder Rights to Inspect Books and Records to Implementing Caremark Duties&#8217; &#124; Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Apr 2021 10:00:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1405#comment-67932</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[[&#8230;] Roy Shapira, &#8216;A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences&#8217;, 98 Washington University Law Review (forthcoming, 2021), available at SSRN. It is well known that corporate compliance departments’ effectiveness depends on the quality of information they receive. In &#8216;A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences&#8217;, Professor Roy Shapira argues that providing information to attorneys for plaintiffs also can enhance compliance. Delaware courts have broadened and are broadening shareholder inspection rights, interpreting DGCL §220. When plaintiff attorneys take advantage of this procedural change, their cases can survive motions to dismiss. Shapira traces out the substantive consequences of this expansion of access: It puts teeth into their Caremark arguments &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] Roy Shapira, &#8216;A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences&#8217;, 98 Washington University Law Review (forthcoming, 2021), available at SSRN. It is well known that corporate compliance departments’ effectiveness depends on the quality of information they receive. In &#8216;A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences&#8217;, Professor Roy Shapira argues that providing information to attorneys for plaintiffs also can enhance compliance. Delaware courts have broadened and are broadening shareholder inspection rights, interpreting DGCL §220. When plaintiff attorneys take advantage of this procedural change, their cases can survive motions to dismiss. Shapira traces out the substantive consequences of this expansion of access: It puts teeth into their Caremark arguments &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]</p>
<img src="https://feedpress.me/link/16865/15699279.gif" height="1" width="1"/>]]></content:encoded>
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      <title>
Comment on Corporate Law in Paradise by ‘Corporate Law in Paradise’ | Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory</title>
      <link>https://feedpress.me/link/16865/14310506/corporate-law-in-paradise</link>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[&#8216;Corporate Law in Paradise&#8217; &#124; Private Law Theory - Obligations, property, legal theory]]></dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 13:31:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://corp.jotwell.com/?p=1392#comment-67837</guid>
      <description><![CDATA[[&#8230;] William Moon, &#8216;Delaware’s New Competition&#8217;, 114 Northwestern University Law Review 403 (2020). William Moon’s thought-provoking recent paper, &#8216;Delaware’s New Competition&#8217;, examines whether there exists an international market for corporate law. Moon’s paper captures a trend in which certain offshore jurisdictions are emerging as corporate lawmakers and attracting publicly traded firms. Specifically, the paper analyzes how a small group of island nations, or &#8216;havens&#8217;, are developing legal infrastructures that attract public companies. It explores how and why foreign nations might compete for a market share of &#8216;American&#8217; corporations &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]]]></description>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] William Moon, &#8216;Delaware’s New Competition&#8217;, 114 Northwestern University Law Review 403 (2020). William Moon’s thought-provoking recent paper, &#8216;Delaware’s New Competition&#8217;, examines whether there exists an international market for corporate law. Moon’s paper captures a trend in which certain offshore jurisdictions are emerging as corporate lawmakers and attracting publicly traded firms. Specifically, the paper analyzes how a small group of island nations, or &#8216;havens&#8217;, are developing legal infrastructures that attract public companies. It explores how and why foreign nations might compete for a market share of &#8216;American&#8217; corporations &#8230; (more) [&#8230;]</p>
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